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Abstract
Testing hypotheses is an issue of primary importance in the scientific
research, as well as in many other human activities. Much clarification
about it can be achieved if the process of learning from data is framed
in a stochastic model of causes and effects. Formulated with Poincare´’s
words, the “essential problem of the experimental method” becomes then
solving a “problem in the probability of causes”, i.e. ranking the several
hypotheses, that might be responsible for the observations, in credibil-
ity. This probabilistic approach to the problem (nowadays known as the
Bayesian approach) differs from the standard (i.e. frequentistic) statis-
tical methods of hypothesis tests. The latter methods might be seen
as practical attempts of implementing the ideal of falsificationism, that
can itself be viewed as an extension of the proof by contradiction of
the classical logic to the experimental method. Some criticisms concern-
ing conceptual as well as practical aspects of na¨ıve falsificationism and
conventional, frequentistic hypothesis tests are presented, and the alter-
native, probabilistic approach is outlined.
Invited talk at the 2004 Vulcano Workshop on Frontier Objects in Astrophysics
and Particle Physics, Vulcano (Italy) May 24-29, 2004.
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Figure 1: From observations to hypotheses. (∗)The link between value of a
quantity and theory is a reminder that sometimes a quantity has meaning only
within a given theory or model [1].
1 Inference, forecasting and related uncertainty
The intellectual process of learning from observations can be sketched as illus-
trated in figure 1. From experimental data we wish to ‘determine’ the value of
some physical quantities, or to establish which theory describes ‘at best’ the
observed phenomena. Although these two tasks are usually seen as separate
issues, and analyzed with different mathematical tools, they can be viewed as
two subclasses of the same process: inferring hypotheses from observations.
What differs between the two kinds of inference is the number of hypotheses
that enters the game: a discrete, usually small number when dealing with
theory comparison; a large, virtually infinite number when inferring the value
of physical quantities.
In general, given some data (past observations), we wish to:
• select a theory and determine its parameters with the aim to describe
and ‘understand’ the physical world;
• predict future observations (that, once they are recorded, they join the
set of past observations to corroborate or diminish our confidence on
each theory and its parameters).
The process of learning from data and predicting new observations is character-
ized by uncertainty (see figure 2). Uncertainty in going from past observations
to the theory and its parameters. Uncertainty in predicting precise observa-
tions from the theory. And, as a consequence, uncertainty in predicting future
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Figure 2: Theory (and the value of its parameters) acting as a link between
past and future.
observations from past observations. Rephrasing the hypothesis-observation
scheme in terms of causes and effects, we can realize that the very source
of uncertainty is due to the not biunivocal relationship between causes and
effects, as sketched in figure 3. The fact that identical causes — identical
according to our knowledge — might produce different effects can be due to
internal (intrinsic) probabilistic aspects of the theory, as well as to our lack
of knowledge about the exact set of causes.1 (Experimental errors are one
of the components of the external probabilistic behavior of the observations.)
However, there is no practical difference between the two situations, as far as
the probabilistic behavior of the result is concerned (i.e. in the status of our
mind concerning the possible outcomes of the experiment), and hence to the
probabilistic character of inference.
Given this cause-effect scheme, having observed an effect, we cannot be
sure about its cause. (This is what happens to effects E2, E3 and E4 of figure
3 — effect E1, that can only be due to cause C1, has to be considered an
exception, at least in the inferential problems scientists typically meet.)
1One might object that if the same cause yields different effects in different trials, then
other concauses must exist, responsible for the differentiation of the effects. This point of
view leads e.g. to the ‘hidden variables’ interpretation of quantummechanics (‘a` la Einstein’).
I have no intention to try to solve, or even to touch all philosophical questions related to
causation (for a modern and fruitful approach, see Ref. [2] and references therein) and of the
fundamental aspects of quantum mechanics. The approach followed here is very pragmatic
and the concept of causation is, to say, a weak one, that perhaps could be better called
conditionalism: “whenever I am sure of this, then I am also somehow confident that that will
occur”. The degree of confidence on the occurrence of that might rise from past experience,
just from reasoning, or from both. It is not really relevant whether this is the cause of that
in a classical sense, or this and that are both due to other ‘true causes’ and we only perceive
a correlation between this and that.
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Figure 3: Causal links (top-down) and inferential links (down-up).
Example 1. As a simple example, think about the effect identified by the
number x = 3 resulting by one of the following random generators cho-
sen at random: H1 = “a Gaussian generator with µ = 0 and σ = 1”; H2
= “a Gaussian generator with µ = 3 and σ = 5”; H3 = “an exponential
generator with τ = 2” (τ stands for the expected value of the exponential
distribution; µ and σ are the usual parameters of the Gaussian distri-
bution). Our problem, stated in intuitive terms, is to find out which
hypothesis might have caused x = 3: H1, H2 or H3? Note that none
of the hypotheses of this example can be excluded and, therefore, there
is no way to reach a boolean conclusion. We can only state, somehow,
our rational preferences, based on the experimental result and our best
knowledge of the behavior of each model.
The human mind is used to live — and survive — in conditions of uncertainty
and has developed mental categories to handle it. Therefore, although we are
in a constant status of uncertainty about many events which might or might
not occur, we can be “more or less sure— or confident— on something than on
something else”. In other words, “we consider something more or less probable
(or likely)”, or “we believe something more or less than something else”. We
can use similar expressions, all referring to the intuitive idea of probability.
The status of uncertainty does not prevent us from doing Science. Indeed,
said with Feynman’s words, “it is scientific only to say what is more likely
and what is less likely” [3]. Therefore, it becomes crucial to learn how to
deal quantitatively with probabilities of causes, because the “problem(s) in
the probability of causes . . .may be said to be the essential problem(s) of the
experimental method” (Poincare´ [4]).
However, and unfortunately, it is a matter of fact that nowadays most
scientists are incapable to reason correctly about probabilities of causes, prob-
abilities of hypotheses, probabilities of values of a quantities, and so on. This
lack of expertise is due to the fact that we have been educated and trained
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with a statistical theory in which the very concept of probability of hypothe-
ses is absent, although we naturally tend to think and express ourselves in
such terms. In other words, the common prejudice is that probability is the
long-term relative frequency, but, on the other hand, probabilistic statements
about hypotheses (or statements implying, anyway, a probabilistic meaning)
are constantly made by the same persons, statements that are irreconcilable
with their definition of probability [5]. The result of this mismatch between
natural thinking and cultural over-structure produces mistakes in scientific
judgment, as discussed e.g. in Refs. [1, 5].
Another prejudice, rather common among scientists, is that, when they
deal with hypotheses, ‘they think they reason’ according to the falsificationist
scheme: hence, the hypotheses tests of conventional statistics are approached
with a genuine intent of proving/falsifying something. For this reason we need
to shortly review these concepts, in order to show the reasons why they are
less satisfactory than we might na¨ıvely think. (The reader is assumed to be
familiar with the concepts of hypothesis tests, though at an elementary level
— null hypothesis, one and two tail tests, acceptance/rejection, significance,
type 1 and type 2 errors, an so on.)
2 Falsificationism and its statistical variations
The essence of the so called falsificationism is that a theory should yield ver-
ifiable predictions, i.e. predictions that can be checked to be true or false. If
an effect is observed that contradicts the theory, the theory is ruled out, i.e.
it is falsified. Though this scheme is certainly appealing, and most scientists
are convinced that this is the way Science proceeds,2 it is easy to realize that
this scheme is a bit na¨ıve, when one tries to apply it literally, as we shall see
in a while. Before doing that, it is important to recognize that falsification-
ism is nothing but an extension of the classical proof by contradiction to the
experimental method.
The proof by contradiction of standard dialectics and mathematics consists
in assuming true a hypothesis and in looking for (at least) one of its logical
consequences that is manifestly false. If a false consequence exists, then the
hypothesis under test is considered false and its opposite true (in the sequel H
will indicate the hypothesis opposite to H, i.e. H is true if H false, and vice
2Those who believe that scientists are really ‘falsificationist’ can find enlighting the follow-
ing famous Einstein’s quote: “If you want to find out anything from the theoretical physicists
about the methods they use, I advise you to stick closely to one principle: don’t listen to their
words, fix your attention on their deeds.”[6]. We shall come to this point in the conclusions.
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versa). Indeed, there is no doubt that if we observe an effect that is impossible
within a theory, this theory has to be ruled out. But the strict application
of the falsificationist criterion is not maintainable in the scientific practice for
several reasons.
1. What should we do of all theories which have not been falsified yet?
Should we consider them all at the same level, parked in a kind of Limbo?
This approach is not very effective. Which experiment should we perform
next? The natural development of Science shows that new investigations
are made in the direction that seems mostly credible (and fruitful) at a
given moment, a behaviour often “179 degrees or so out of phase from
Popper’s idea that we make progress by falsificating theories” [7].
2. If the predictions of a theory are characterized by the internal or external
probabilistic behavior discussed above, how can we ever think of falsify-
ing such a theory, speaking rigorously? For instance, there is no way to
falsify hypothesis H1 of Example 1, because any real number is compat-
ible with any Gaussian. For the same reason, falsificationism cannot be
used to make an inference about the value of a physical quantity (for a
Gaussian response of the detector, no value of µ can be falsified what-
ever we observe, and, unfortunately, falsificationism does not tell how to
classify non-falsified values in credibility).
An extension of strict falsificationism is offered by the statistical test meth-
ods developed by statisticians. Indeed, the latter methods might be seen as
attempts of implementing in practice the falsificationism principle. It is there-
fore important to understand the ‘little’ variations of the statistical tests with
respect to the proof of contradiction (and hence to strict falsificationism).
a) The impossible consequence is replaced by an improbable consequence.
If this improbable consequence occurs, then the hypothesis is rejected,
otherwise it is accepted. The implicit argument on the basis of the hy-
pothesis test approach of conventional statistics is: “if E is practically
impossible given H, then H is considered practically false given the ob-
servation E.” But this probability inversion — initially qualitative, but
then turned erroneously quantitative by most practitioners, attributing
to ‘H given E’ the same probability of ‘E given H’ — is not logically jus-
tified and it is not difficult to show that it yields misleading conclusions.
Let us see some simple examples.
Example 2 Considering only hypothesis H1 of Example 1 and taking
E = “4 ≤ x ≤ 5”, we can calculate the probability of obtaining E
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from H1: P (E |H1) = 3 × 10
−5. This probability is rather small,
but, once E has occurred, we cannot state that “E has little prob-
ability to come from H1”, or that “H1 has little probability to have
caused E”: E is certainly due to H1!
Example 3 “I play honestly at lotto, betting on a rare combination”
(= H) and “win” (= E). You cannot say that since E is ‘practi-
cally impossible’ given H, then hypothesis H has to be ‘practically
excluded’, after you have got the information that I have won [such
a conclusion would imply that it is ‘practically true’ that “I have
cheated” (= H)].
Example 4 An AIDS test to detect HIV infection is perfect to tag
HIV infected people as ‘positive’ (=Pos), i.e. P (Pos |HIV) = 1,
but it can sometimes err, and classify healthy persons (= HIV)
as positive, although with low probability, e.g. P (Pos |HIV) =
0.2%. An Italian citizen is chosen at random to undergo such a test
and he/she is tagged positive. We cannot claim that “since it was
practically impossible that a healthy person resulted positive, then
this person is practically infected”, or, quantitatively, “there is only
0.2% probability that this person is not infected”.
We shall see later how to solve these kind of problems correctly. For
the moment the important message is that it is not correct to replace
‘improbable’ in logical methods that speak about ‘impossible’ (and to use
then the reasoning to perform ‘probabilistic inversions’): impossible and
improbable differ in quality, not just in quantity!
b) In many cases the number of effects due to a hypothesis is so large that
each effect is ‘practically impossible’.3 Even those who trust the reason-
ing based on the small probability of effects to falsify hypotheses have
to realize that the reasoning fails in these cases, because every obser-
vation can be used as an evidence against the hypothesis to be tested.
Statisticians have then worked out methods in which the observed effect
is replaced by two ensembles of effects, one of high chance and another
of low chance. The reasoning based on the ‘practically impossible’ ef-
fect is then extended to the latter ensemble. This is the essence of all
tests tests based on “p-values”[8] (what physicists know as “probability
3In the hypothetical experiment of one million tosses of a hypothetical ‘regular coin’
(easily realized by a little simulation) the result of 500 000 heads represents an ‘extraordinary
event’ (8× 10−4 probability), as ‘extraordinary’ are all other possible outcomes!
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of tails” upon which χ2 and other famous tests are based). Logically,4
the situation gets worse, because conclusions do not depend anymore on
what has been observed, but also on effects that have not been observed5
(see e.g. Ref. [9]).
c) Apart from the simple case of just one observation, the data are summa-
rized by a ‘test variable’ (e.g. χ2), function of the data, and the reason-
ing discussed above is applied to the test variable. This introduces an
additional, arbitrary ingredient to this already logically tottering con-
struction.6
d) Even in simple problems, that could be formulated in terms of a sin-
gle quantity, given the empirical information there might be ambiguity
about which quantity plays the role of the random variable upon which
the p-value has to be calculated.7
4The fact that in practice these methods ‘often work’ is a different story, as discussed in
Sec. 10.8 of Ref. [1].
5In other words, the reasoning based on p-values [8] constantly violates the so called
likelihood principle, apart from exceptions due to numerical coincidences. In fact, making the
simple example of a single-tail test based on a variable that is indeed observed, the conclusion
about acceptance or rejection is made on the basis of
∫
∞
xobs
f(x | θ) dx, where θ are the model
parameters. But this integral is rarely simply proportional to the likelihood f(xobs | θ), i.e.
integral and likelihood do not differ by just a constant factor not depending on θ. I would
like to make clear that I dislike un-needed principles, including the likelihood one, and the
maximum likelihood one above all. The reason why I refer here to the likelihood principle in
my argumentation is that, generally, frequentists consider this principle with some respect,
but their methods usually violate it [10]. Instead, in the probabilistic approach illustrated
in the sequel, this ’principle’ stems automatically from the theory.
6In statistics the variables that summarize all the information sufficient for the inference
are called a sufficient statistics (classical examples are the sample average and standard
deviation to infer µ and σ of a Gaussian distribution). However, I do not know of test
variables that can be considered sufficient for hypothesis tests.
7Imagine you have to decide if the extraction of n white balls in N trials can be considered
in agreement with the hypothesis that the box contains a given percentage p of white balls.
You might think that you are dealing with a binomial problem, in which n plays the role
of random variable, calculate the p-value and draw your conclusions. But you might get
the information that the person who made the extraction had decided to go on until he/she
reached n white balls. In this case the random variable is N , the problem is modeled by
a Pascal distribution (or, alternatively, by a negative binomial in which the role of random
variable is played by the number N −n of non-white balls) and the evaluation of the p-value
differs from the previous one. This problem is known as the stopping rule problem. It can
be proved that the likelihood calculated from the two reasonings differ only by a constant
factor, and hence the likelihood principle tells that the two reasonings should lead to identical
inferential conclusions about the unknown percentage of white balls.
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Anyhow, apart from questions that might seem subtle philosophical quibbles,
conventional tests lead to several practical problems.
• In my opinion the most serious problem is the fact that p-values are
constantly used in scientific conclusions as if they were the probability
that the hypothesis under test is true (for example people report a p-
value of 0.0003 as “the hypothesis is excluded at 99.97% C.L.”, as if
they were 99.97% confident that the hypothesis to test is false). The
consequence of this misunderstanding is very serious, and it is essentially
responsible for all claims of fake discoveries in the past decades (see some
examples in Sec. 1.9 of Ref. [1].)
• Statistical tests are not based on first principles of any kind. Hundreds
of statistical tests have been contrived and their choice is basically arbi-
trary. I have experienced that discussions in experimental teams about
which test to use and how to use it are not deeper than discussions in
pubs among soccer fans (Italian readers might think at the ‘Processo di
Biscardi’ talk show, quite often also in the tones).
• There is sometimes a tendency to look for the test that gives the desired
result. Personally, I find that the fancier the name of the test is, the
less believable the claim is, because I am pretty sure that other, more
common tests were discarded because ‘they were not appropriate’, an
expression to be often interpreted as “the other tests did not support
what the experimentalist wanted the data to prove” (and I could report
of people that, frustrated by the ‘bad results’ obtained with frequentistic
tests, contacted me hoping for a Bayesian miracle — they got regularly
disappointed because, ‘unfortunately’, Bayesian methods, consciously
applied, tend not to feed vain illusions).
• Standard statistical methods, essentially a contradictory collection of
ad-hoc-eries, induce scientists, and physicists in particular, to think that
‘statistics’ is something ‘not serious’, thus encouraging ‘creative’ behav-
iors.8
8Just in this workshop I have met yet another invention [11]: Given three model fits
to data with 40 degrees of freedom and the three resulting χ2 of 37.9, 49.1 and 52.4 for
models M1, M3 and M3, the common frequentistic wisdom says the three models are about
equivalent in describing the data, because the expected χ2 is 40±9, or that none of the models
can be ruled out because all p-values (0.56, 0.15 and 0.091, respectively) are above the usual
critical level of significance. Nevertheless, SuperKamiokande claims that models M2 andM3
are ‘disfavored’ at 3.3 and 3.8 σ’s, respectively! (1 × 10−3 and 1.4 × 10−4 probability.) It
seems the result has been achieved using inopportunely a technique of parametric inference.
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3 Forward to the past: probabilistic reasoning
The dominant school in statistics since the beginning of last century is based on
a quite unnatural approach to probability, in contrast to that of the founding
fathers (Poisson, Bernoulli, Bayes, Laplace, Gauss, etc.). In this dominant ap-
proach (frequentism) there is no room for the concept of probability of causes,
probability of hypotheses, probability of the values of physical quantities, and
so on. Problems in the probability of the causes (“the essential problem of the
experimental method”! [4]) have been replaced by the machinery of the hypoth-
esis tests. But people think naturally in terms of probability of causes, and
the mismatch between natural thinking and standard education in statistics
leads to the troubles discussed above.
I think that the way out is simply to go back to the past. In our time of
rushed progress an invitation to go back to century old ideas seems at least
odd (imagine a similar proposal regarding physics, chemistry or biology!). I
admit it, but I do think it is the proper way to follow. This doesn’t mean we
have to drop everything done in probability and statistics in between. Most
mathematical work can be easily recovered. In particular, we can benefit
of theoretical clarifications and progresses in probability theory of the past
century. We also take great advantage of the boost of computational capability
occurred very recently, from which both symbolic and numeric methods have
enormously benefitted. (In fact, many frequentistic ideas had their raison
d’ eˆtre in the computational barrier that the original probabilistic approach
met. Many simplified – though often simplistic – methods were then proposed
to make the live of practitioners easier. But nowadays computation cannot be
considered any longer an excuse.)
In summary, the proposed way out can be summarized in an invitation to
use probability theory consistently. But before you do it, you need to review
the definition of probability, otherwise it is simply impossible to use all the
power of the theory. In the advised approach probability quantifies how much
we believe in something, i.e. we recover its intuitive idea. Once this is done,
we can essentially use the formal probability theory based on Kolmogorov
axioms (which can indeed be derived, and with a better awareness about their
meaning, from more general principles! – but I shall not enter this issue here).
Imagine a minimum χ2 fit of the parameter θ for which the data give a minimum χ2 of 37.9
at θ = θ1, while χ
2(θ2) = 49.1 and χ
2(θ3) = 52.4 (and the χ
2 curve is parabolic). It follows
that θ2 and θ3 are, respectively,
√
49.1− 37.9 σ’s = 3.3 σ’s and √52.4− 37.9 σ’s = 3.8 σ’s far
from θ1. The probability that θ differs from θ1 by more than |θ2 − θ1| and |θ3 − θ1| is then
P (|θ− θ1| > |θ2− θ1|) = 1× 10−3 and P (|θ− θ1| > |θ3− θ1|) = 1.4× 10−4, respectively. But
this is quite a different problem!
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This ‘new’ approach is called Bayesian because of the central role played
by Bayes theorem in learning from experimental data. The theorem teaches
how the probability of each hypothesis Hi has to be updated in the light of
the new observation E:
P (Hi |E, I) =
P (E |Hi, I) · P (Hi | I)
P (E | I)
. (1)
I stands for a background condition, or status of information, under which
the inference is made. A more frequent Bayes’ formula in text books, valid if
the hypotheses are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, is
P (Hi |E, I) =
P (E |Hi, I) · P (Hi | I)∑
i P (E |Hi, I) · P (Hi | I)
. (2)
The denominator in the right hand side of (2) is just a normalization factor
and, as such, it can be neglected. Moreover it is possible to show that a
similar structure holds for probability density functions (p.d.f.) if a continuous
variable is considered (µ stands here for a generic ‘true value’, associated to a
parameter of a model). Calling ‘data’ the overall effect E, we get the following
formulae on which inference is to be ground:
P (Hi |data, I) ∝ P (data |Hi, I) · P (Hi | I) (3)
f(µ |data, I) ∝ f(data |µ, I) · f(µ | I) , (4)
the first formula used in probabilistic comparison of hypotheses, the second
(mainly) in parametric inference. In both cases we have the same structure:
posterior ∝ likelihood × prior , (5)
where ‘posterior’ and ‘prior’ refer to our belief on that hypothesis, i.e. taking
or not taking into account the ‘data’ on which the present inference is based.
The likelihood, that is “how much we believe that the hypothesis can pro-
duce the data” (not to be confused with “how much we believe that the data
come from the hypothesis”!), models the stochastic flow that leads from the
hypothesis to the observations, including the best modeling of the detector
response. The structure of (5) shows us that the inference based on Bayes
theorem satisfies automatically the likelihood principle (likelihoods that differ
by constant factors lead to the same posterior).
The proportionality factors in (3) and (4) are determined by normalization,
if absolute probabilities are needed. Otherwise we can just put our attention
on probability ratios:
P (Hi |data, I)
P (Hj |data, I)
=
P (data |Hi, I
P (data |Hj , I)
·
P (Hi | I)
P (Hj | I)
(6)
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i.e.
posterior odds ∝ Bayes factor× prior odds : (7)
odds are updated by data via the ratio of the likelihoods, called Bayes factor.
There are some well known psychological (indeed cultural and even ideo-
logical) resistances to this approach due to the presence of the priors in the
theory. Some remarks are therefore in order:
• priors are unescapable, if we are interested in ‘probabilities of causes’
(stated differently, there is no other way to relate consistently probabil-
ities of causes to probabilities of effects avoiding Bayes theorem);
• therefore, you should mistrust methods that pretend to provide ‘levels of
confidence’ (in the sense of how much you are confident) independently
from priors (arbitrariness is often sold for objectivity!);
• in many ‘routine’ applications the results of measurements depend weakly
on priors and many standard formulae, usually derived from maximum
likelihood or least square principles, can be promptly recovered under
well defined conditions of validity,
• but in other cases priors might have a strong influence on the conclusions;
• if we understand the role and the relevance of the priors, we shall be able
to provide useful results in the different cases (for example, when the
priors dominate the conclusions and there is no agreement about prior
knowledge, it is better to refrain from providing probabilistic results:
Bayes factors may be considered a convenient way to report how the
experimental data push toward either hypothesis; similarly, upper/lower
“xx% C.L.’s” are highly misleading and should be simply replaced by
sensitivity bounds [1]).
To make some numerical examples, let us solve two of the problems met above.
(In order to simplify the notation the background condition ‘I’ is not indicated
explicitly in the following formulae).
Solution of the AIDS problem (Example 4)
Applying Eq. (6) we get
P (HIV |Pos)
P (HIV |Pos)
=
P (Pos |HIV)
P (Pos |HIV)
·
P (HIV)
P (HIV)
. (8)
The Bayes factor P (Pos |HIV)/P (Pos |HIV) is equal to 1/0.002 = 500.
This is how much the information provided by the data ‘pushes’ towards
12
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Figure 4: Example 1: likelihoods for the three different hypotheses. The
vertical bar corresponds to the observation x = 3.
the hypothesis ‘infected’ with respect to the hypothesis ‘healthy’. If the
ratio of priors were equal to 1 [i.e. P (HIV) = P (HIV) !], we would get
final odds of 500, i.e. P (HIV |Pos) = 500/501 = 99.8%. But, fortu-
nately, for a randomly chosen Italian P (HIV) is not 50%. Putting some
more reasonable numbers, that might be 1/600 or 1/700, we have final
odds of 0.83 or 0.71, corresponding to a P (HIV |Pos) of 45% or 42%.
We understand now the source of the mistake done by quite some peo-
ple in front of this problem: priors were unreasonable! This is a typical
situation: using the Bayesian reasoning it is possible to show the hidden
assumptions of non-Bayesian reasonings, though most users of the latter
methods object, insisting in claiming they “do not use priors”.
Solution of the three hypothesis problem (Example 1)
The Bayes factors between hypotheses i and j, i.e. BFi,j = f(x =
3 |Hi)/f(x = 3 |Hj), are BF2,1 = 18, BF3,1 = 25 and BF3,2 = 1.4. The
observation x = 3 favors models 2 and 3, but the resulting probabilities
depend on priors. Assuming prior equiprobability among the three gen-
erators we get the following posterior probabilities for the three models:
2.3%, 41% and 57%. (In alternative, we could know that the extraction
mechanism does not choose the three generators at random with the
same probability, and the result would change.)
Instead, if we made an analysis based on p-value we would get that H1
is “excluded” at a 99.87% C.L. or at 99.7% C.L., depending whether a
one-tail or a two-tail test is done. Essentially, the perception that H1
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could be the correct cause of x = 3 is about 10-20 times smaller than
that given by the Bayesian analysis. As far as the comparison between
H2 and H3 is concerned, the p-value analysis is in practice inapplicable
(what would you do?) and one says that both models describe about
equally well the result, which is more or less what we get out of the
Bayesian analysis. However, the latter analysis gives some quantitative
information: a slight hint in favor ofH3, that could be properly combined
with many other small hints coming from other pieces of experimental
information, and that, all together, might allow us to finally arrive to
select one of the models.
4 Conclusions
The main message of this contribution is an invitation to review critically
several concepts and methods to which we are somehow accustomed.
Strict falsificationism is definitely na¨ıve and its implementation via fre-
quentistic hypothesis tests is logically seriously flawed. Such tests ‘often work’
— unfortunately I cannot not go through this point for lack of space and I
refer to Section 10.8 of Ref. [1] — if we want to use them to form a rough
idea about whether it is worth investigating in alternative hypotheses that
would describe the data better. Stated in different words, there is nothing to
reproach — and I admit I do it — calculating a χ2 variable to get a idea of
the ‘distance’ between a model and the data. What is not correct is to use the
χ2, or any other test variable to quantitatively assess our confidence on that
model.
An alternative way of reasoning, based on probability theory and then ca-
pable to quantify consistently our confidence in formal probabilistic terms, has
been shortly outlined. I hope that, also with the help of the simple examples,
the paper has been able to convey some important points.
• Bayes theorem provides a consistent way to learn from data both for
probabilistic parametric inference and probabilistic model comparison.
• In order to perform a model comparison at least two fully specified
hypotheses are needed [i.e. of which we are able to evaluate, though
roughly, the likelihood f(data |Hi(θ)), where θ are the model parame-
ters].
• Scientific conclusions, i.e. how much we believe in either hypothesis,
must depend on priors — would you trust an ‘ad hoc’ model tailored on
the data you are going to use for the inference?
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• If a hypothesis is hardly believable with respect to an alternative hy-
pothesis, then it is absolutely normal that a stronger evidence in favor
of it is needed, before we reverse our preference.
• The Bayes factor can be considered an unbiased way to report how much
the data alone ‘push’ towards each hypothesis.
An example of model comparison applied to real data, in tune with the work-
shop themes and written also with didactic intent, can be found in Ref. [12].9
Another important class of applications, not discussed in this paper, con-
cerns parametric inference. Essentially, one starts from Eq. (4), and all the rest
is ‘just math’, including the extensions to several dimensions and some ‘tricks’
to get the computation done. It can be easily shown that standard methods
can be recovered as approximated application of the Bayesian inference under
some well defined assumptions that usually hold in routine applications. I
refer to Refs. [1] and [13] for details concerning this point, as well as for other
issues in Bayesian data analysis not discussed here, and a rich bibliography.
Finally, I would like to add some epistemological remarks. The first one
concerns falsificationism, since after my conference talk I have received quite
some energetic reactions of colleagues who defended that principle. From a
probabilistic perspective, falsificationism is easily recovered if the likelihood
vanishes, i.e. f(data |Hi) = 0. However this condition is rarely met in the
scientific practice, if we speak rigorously (zero is a very committing value!).
I guess we just speak of falsificationism because that is what we have
being taught is the ‘good thing’, but without being aware of its implica-
tions. It seems to me we actually think in terms of something that should
better be named testability, that can be stated quite easily in the language
of probabilistic inference. Given a hypothesis Hi, testability requires that
the likelihood is positive in a region Q of the space of the achievable ex-
perimental outcomes of an experiment Exp [i.e. f(x inQ |Hi, Exp) 6= 0]
and is not trivially proportional to the likelihood of another hypotheses [i.e.
f(x inQ |Hi, Exp)/f(x inQ |Hj , Exp) 6= k]. These are in fact the conditions
for a hypothesis to gain in credibility, via Bayes theorem, over the alternative
hypotheses in the light of the expected experimental results. The theory is
definitively falsified if the experimental outcome falls on another region Q′
9Reference [12] has to be taken more for its methodological contents than for the physical
outcome (a tiny piece of evidence in favor of the searched for signal), for in the meanwhile
I have become personally very sceptical about the experimental data on which the analysis
was based, after having heard a couple of public talks by authors of those data during 2004
(one in this workshop).
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such that f(x inQ′ |Hi, Exp) = 0. Therefore, falsificationism is just a special
case of the Bayesian inference.
Anyway, if there is a topic in which falsificationism can be applied in a strict
sense, this topic concerns the use of conventional statistical methods, as I wrote
elsewhere [1]: “I simply apply scientific methodology to statistical reasoning in
the same way as we apply it in Physics and in Science in general. If, for
example, experiments show that Parity is violated, we can be disappointed,
but we simply give up the principle of Parity Conservation, at least in the
kind of interactions in which it has been observed that it does not hold. I
do not understand why most of my colleagues do not behave in a similar way
with the Maximum Likelihood principle, or with the ‘prescriptions’ for building
Confidence Intervals, both of which are known to produce absurd results.”
The second epistemological remark concerns another presumed myth of
scientists, i.e. that “since Galileo an accepted base of scientific research is the
repeatability of experiments.”[14] (“This assumption justifies the Frequentistic
definition of probability . . . ” — continues the author.) Clearly, according
to this point of view, most things discussed in this workshop are ’not scien-
tific’. Fortunately, it is presently rather well accepted (also by the author of
Ref. [14], I understand) that Science can be also based on a collection of in-
dividual facts that we cannot repeat at will, or that might happen naturally
and beyond our control (but there is still someone claiming fields like Geology,
Evolutionary Biology and even Astrophysics are not Science!). The relevant
thing that allows us to build up a rational scientific knowledge grounded on
empirical observations is that we are capable to relate, though in a stochastic
way and with the usual unavoidable uncertainties, our conjectures to experi-
mental observations, no matter if the phenomena occur spontaneously or arise
under well controlled experimental conditions. In other words, we must be
able to model, though approximately, the likelihoods that connect hypotheses
to observations. This way of building the scientific edifice is excellently ex-
pressed in the title of one of the volumes issued to celebrate the Centennial
of the Carnegie Institute of Washington [15]. This scientific building can be
formally (and graphically) described by the so called ‘Bayesian networks’ or
‘belief networks’ [2]. If you have never heard these expressions, try to google
them and you will discover a new world (and how behind we physicists are,
mostly sticking to books and lecture notes that are too often copies of copies
of obsolete books!).
It is a pleasure to thank the organizers for the stimulating workshop in such
a wonderful location, Paolo Agnoli and Dino Esposito for useful comments.
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